Link zum Material: https://www.china-schul-akademie.de/materialien/m-wirtschaft-m4-4
| Autor | Titel | Datum | Einordnung |
|---|---|---|---|
| Urheber*in: Daten: Tom’s Hardware. MERICS. Grafik und Zusammenstellung: Sascha Zhivkov | Titel: “10,000 Chinese Chip Developers Closed Shop in 2021–2022.” „Chinese Chip-Related Companies Shutting down with Record Speed — 10,900, or around 30 per Day, Shut down in 2023.“ „Goals of ‚Made in China 2025‘ Are Unachievable: Tsinghua Professor.“ „Huawei is quietly dominating China’s semiconductor supply chain | Merics.“ | Entstehungsdatum: 2024 | Einordnung: Computerchips sind in der modernen Welt nicht mehr wegzudenken. Sie stecken nicht nur in Desktop-PCs und Laptops, sondern in nahezu allen modernen Geräten von Waffensystemen, dem Automobil über Beatmungsgeräte bis hin zu alltäglichen Helfern wie dem Kühlschrank. Chips wird deshalb für die Wirtschaft der Zukunft, das Internet der Dinge und die Industrie 4.0 eine entscheidende Bedeutung zugemessen. Während amerikanische Unternehmen den Endmarkt mit bis zu 47% Marktanteil beherrschen - (SIA 2022: 3) - sind bei der Herstellung und Produktion von Computerchips und insbesondere den dafür so zentralen Halbleitern asiatische Firmen wie Samsung (Südkorea) oder die Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) führend. Über 80% der Chips werden in Asien gefertigt (Asia Times 2024). Im Zuge ihrer wirtschaftspolitischen Modernisierungsstrategie ist die Chipindustrie deshalb auch für die VR China entscheidend. 2014 wurde der China Integrated Circuit Investment Fund (国家集成电路产业投资基金, sog. “Big Fund”) aufgelegt, der seither in drei Runden zusammengenommen 95,7 Mrd. USD zur Förderung der inländischen Chipindustrie zur Verfügung gestellt hat (Fortune 2024). Hinzu kommen lokale, nicht genau bezifferbare Förderprogramme. An den Zahlen des Materials lässt sich ablesen, dass die VR China in der Tat ihre Fertigungskapazitäten für Computerchips seit 2015 stark ausgeweitet hat. Allerdings ist auch zu sagen, dass viele chinesische Chiphersteller bereits wieder schließen mussten (Tom’s Hardware 2023) – insbesondere infolge der Sanktionen in der Chipindustrie seitens der USA (siehe unten). Der inländische Bedarf an Computerchips ist enorm – laut dem Tsinghua-Professor Wei Shaojun etwa 1,5 Millionen Chips pro Monat. Die VR China kann diesen Bedarf aktuell nicht decken (440.000 inländisch produzierte Chips), man ist also von ausländischen Importen abhängig. Das zentrale Ziel von Made in China 2025, 70% der Chipfertigung im Inland bis 2025 zu erreichen, sei deshalb nicht realisierbar (Tom’s Hardware 2023b). Weiterhin möchte die VR China auch technologisch aufholen. Einige den Computerchips zugrundeliegenden Technologien sind hochspezialisiert und können nur von wenigen Firmen weltweit hergestellt werden. Dies gilt zum Beispiel für die Fotolitographie. Diese muss man sich laut dem Fraunhofer-Institut München wie eine Maske bei einem Dia vorstellen, wo man Bilder vergrößern würde, nur wird hier dem entgegen das Bild für den Druck extrem verkleinert. Die Elektronenstrahlen müssen ihren Weg finden und ein- und ausgeschaltet werden können (im Prinzip wie bei einem winzigen Duschkopf). Da ein Elektronenstrahl auf der Maske nur 20 nm beträgt (ein menschliches Haar hat 50.000 nm) und auf dem Wafer des Chips weiter verkleinert wird, kann man sich die technologischen Ansprüche an diese Technologie vorstellen: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Fnfjp3vqIxg Übereinstimmenden Berichten zufolge konnte die chinesische Chipindustrie den Vorsprung der weltweit führenden Firmen, wie zum Beispiel ASML (Niederlande) bei der Fotolitographie, bislang nicht wettmachen. Der bekannteste fortschrittliche Chip aus festlandchinesischer Produktion ist auf 7 nm gefertigt, der von TSMC aus Taiwan hingegen auf 3 nm (2024). Im Zuge des US-chinesischen Handelskrieges (siehe M3.4) ist auch die technologische Rivalität in Fragen wie der obigen sehr relevant. Amerikanische Sanktionen gegenüber der VR China betreffen alle fortschrittlichen Chips unter 14nm. Die amerikanische Politik führt vor allem Sicherheitsbedenken als Grund für ihre Sanktionen an – allerdings sprechen einige Stimmen auch von handelsprotektionistischen Beweggründen (Kim 2024). Berichten zufolge will Washington auch die mit den USA alliierten Staaten hier noch stärker in die Pflicht zu nehmen. Sollten sie den US-Sanktionen nicht folgen, werden wiederum Sanktionen gegen die Verbündeten erwogen (Eitel 2024). Andersherum beschränkt auch die VR China den Export von wichtigen, im Land geförderten seltenen Erden wie Gallium und Germanium, die in der Chipproduktion nötig sind (MERICS 2024). Es bleibt abzuwarten, wie sich die festlandchinesische Chipindustrie weiterhin entwickeln kann. Auch der Souveränitätskonflikt der VR China mit Taiwan kann hier noch eine bedeutende Rolle bekommen, da Taiwan in dieser so wichtigen Industrie weltweit führend ist und eine mögliche festländische Invasion in Taiwan im Raum steht. Sascha Zhivkov, 08.08.2024 Verwendete Literatur
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Modul Wirtschaft Chipindustrie
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%20cooperation.39%20Going%20forward%2C%20the%20TIER-based%20controls%20could%20make%20it%20harder%20for%20Chinese%20firms%20to%20license%20their%20technology%20to%20European%20partners.These%20kinds%20of%20discussions%20have%20influenced%20export%20control%20decisions%20in%20some%20cases%2C%20leading%20to%20more%20restraint%20on%20the%20part%20of%20the%20authorities.%20In%20an%20earlier%20draft%20of%20the%20catalogue%2C%20MOFCOM%20proposed%20banning%20exports%20of%20certain%20core%20technologies%20for%20making%20solar%20panels%20but%20dropped%20the%20idea%20from%20the%20final%20version.%20Chinese%20companies%20and%20experts%20had%20raised%20concerns%2C%20pointing%20out%20some%20European%20and%20US%20competitors%20had%20already%20responded%20by%20restarting%20their%20own%20production.40Nevertheless%2C%20the%20advantages%20Chinese%20authorities%20can%20gain%20from%20improving%20their%20ability%20to%20monitor%20technology-related%20outflows%20should%20not%20be%20discounted.%20This%20benefit%20is%20strong%20when%20the%20catalogue%20introduces%20a%20licensing%20requirement%20rather%20than%20a%20blanket%20ban.%20Through%20processing%20the%20license%20applications%20of%20Chinese%20and%20foreign%20companies%20the%20government%20could%20be%20gathering%20useful%20supply%20chain%20data%20for%20industrial%20policy%20purposes.41%20%2C%20Beijing%5Cu2019s%20toolkit%20for%20controlling%20tech-related%20outflows%20goes%20beyond%20export%20controls%20China%5Cu2019s%20capacities%20and%20tools%20to%20preserve%20national%20technological%20leadership%20go%20much%20farther%20than%20export%20controls%20and%20are%20unmatched%20by%20any%20OECD%20economy.%20Some%20of%20these%20are%20not%20specific%20to%20China%2C%20and%20indeed%20the%20Unites%20States%20also%20considers%20long-term%20competitiveness%20a%20national%20security%20objective.42%20What%20sets%20China%20apart%20are%20the%20number%20of%20instruments%20it%20has%20and%20its%20tendency%20to%20use%20them%20beyond%20their%20designated%20purpose%2C%20based%20on%20a%20broad%20definition%20of%20%5Cu201cnational%20security%20and%20interests%5Cu201d.%20Xi%5Cu2019s%20national%20security%20push%20has%20created%20multiple%20new%20legal%20and%20regulatory%20tools.%20His%20emphasis%20on%20the%20geostrategic%20importance%20of%20S%26T%2C%20coupled%20with%20China%5Cu2019s%20track%20record%20of%20economic%20coercion%20and%20absence%20of%20rule%20of%20law%2C%20sparks%20legitimate%20worry%20of%20discretionary%20application%20among%20its%20trading%20partners.%20Noteworthy%20clauses%20even%20allow%20retaliatory%20measures%20to%20actions%20by%20a%20foreign%20government.43%20By%20tightly%20managing%20outflows%20of%20technology%2C%20raw%20materials%2C%20capital%2C%20IP%2C%20S%26T%20personnel%2C%20as%20well%20as%20data%20and%20technical%20information%2C%20Beijing%20can%20onshore%20value%20chains%20and%20control%20foreign%20access.Monitoring%20and%20controlling%20S%26T%20development%2C%20talent%20and%20IPFor%20starters%2C%20Chinese%20authorities%20have%20an%20extra%20lever%20to%20control%20S%26T%20inputs%20and%20outputs%20that%20OECD%20countries%20lack%2C%20namely%20their%20outsized%20involvement%20in%20technology%20research%2C%20development%20and%20commercialization.%20The%20party%20state%20directly%20manages%20a%20lot%20of%20research%20and%20development%20%28R%26D%29%20activity%20in%20strategic%20sectors.%20Research%20centers%20are%20undergoing%20tighter%20centralized%20monitoring%20and%20guidance.44%20State-owned%20enterprises%2C%20abnormally%20prevalent%20in%20patenting%2C%20have%20been%20ordered%20to%20contribute%20more%20to%20S%26T%20development.%20Their%20new%20tasks%20include%20better%20controlling%20strategic%20value%20chains%2C%20especially%20tech-intensive%20sectors.45%20There%20has%20been%20an%20uptick%20in%20state%20involvement%20even%20in%20areas%20that%20tend%20to%20be%20privately%20driven%2C%20such%20as%20startup%20funding.46China%5Cu2019s%20government%20also%20has%20unique%20powers%20over%20the%20outflow%20of%20talent.47%20The%20Ministry%20of%20Education%20%28MOE%29%20has%20required%20university%20approval%20for%20all%20academic%20overseas%20trips%20and%20collaborations%20since%202016%2C%20though%20it%20seems%20enforcement%20only%20began%20more%20recently%2C%20generating%20complaints%20from%20prominent%20Chinese%20academics.48%20Top%20talents%20even%20face%20travel%20restrictions.49Foreign%20access%20to%20Chinese%20IP%2C%20meanwhile%2C%20is%20tightly%20monitored.%20As%20mentioned%20in%20the%20previous%20section%2C%20a%20review%20process%20is%20required%20for%20any%20foreign%20transfer%20of%20IPR%20related%20to%20technology%20on%20the%20civilian%20technology%20export%20control%20catalogue.%20The%20S%26T%20Progress%20Law%2C%20meanwhile%2C%20hinders%20the%20overseas%20transfer%20of%20IP%20generated%20by%20government-funded%20projects%2C%20even%20after%20its%202021%20amendment%20made%20some%20concessions%20to%20foreign%20scientists.50The%202020%20Patent%20Law%20governs%20a%20non-public%20p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